Abstract: Subjectivity has always been a part of philosophical speculations. However, Immanuel
23

Introduction
24
There is of course still a big discussion if subjectivity is to be regarded as a valid factor in 25 scientific research and thinking. Nevertheless, subjectivity is a factor that is more or less accepted 26 depending on the scientific perspective the researcher may have. After Kant and Kierkegaard the 27 aspect of subjectivity has been accepted as an ingredient of philosophy. The fundamental question is
28
rather to what extent it is a factor we should accept or avoid. In this question Kant and Kierkegaard 
29
stands on oppositional sides. Kant took subjectivity as a point of departure, but tried to derive some 30 objective fundamentals out of it, whereas Kierkegaard accepted subjectivity as the ultimate truth.
31
Subjective aspects, however, are traceable in all philosophy, even in Plato's dialogues, like the 32 Symposion, Ion, Faidros and other places where Plato opens up for deep emotional experiences. In this 33 sense, one may say there is a continuous line in philosophy to which subjectivity has appeared as an 34 underlying factor.
35
However, philosophy is highly influenced by Kant. It is characterized by admitting that 36 subjectivity is a factor, but at the same time there is a tendency to mitigate its role as much as 37 possible. However, Søren Kierkegaard was the first one to highlight subjectivity as a sort of ideal by 38 launching "truth is subjectivity" as a strategic slogan (Kierkegaard 2009 ). He also formed it as a basis 39 for existentialism, which in the posterity has been an accepted and well-established direction in
40
philosophy. Yet, Kierkegaard was quite clear about the fact that the aspect of subjectivity did not 41 belong to philosophy, but rather to psychology (Klempe 2014) . Hence he was also quite clear about In line with this, there seems to have existed a deep conflict between philosophy and 48 psychology, and that there are reasons to look at the differences and define them as different and 49 separate sciences. Other places, I have suggested that ontology may represent a demarcation 50 criterion for dividing philosophy from psychology (Klempe 2015) . The argument is; if psychology is 51 about subjective impressions of particularities, the truth-value of an impression's ontological 52 existence is not the most interesting aspect of it. Just the subjective statement of something should be 53 sufficient to call for psychological attention. This is not the case for philosophy, in which the 54 truth-value of a phenomenon's existence will be at the core of a philosophical investigation. This 55 argument is also embedded with some historical aspects as the term ontology was not applied in 56 philosophy before Rodolphus Goclenius launched an embryonic version of the term in his 57 philosophical lexicon from 1613 -not as a headword, though, but as a part of an article on 58 "Abstractio" (Mengal 2005) . Furthermore, Goclenius was also the scholar that stands behind the first 59 and still preserved thesis in the history that mentions 'psychology' in the title. Allegedly, Marcus
60
Marullus had already applied the term in the title of a book published around 1520 (Krstic 1964 ), but 61 this we do not have. Marullus was an important poet who belonged to the movement of Italian
62
Humanism, and Goclenius was an important professor at the new, Protestant University in
63
Marburg. Hence, both were associated with the new ideological movements in the renaissance, and
64
there are reasons to see the term as being strongly associated with those movements. Thus with 65 these aspects in mind there are reason to ask if psychology back then represented a new perspective 66 that had not been included in philosophy earlier, and therefore add a question mark to the notion 67 that psychology has always been a part of philosophy. This is the question I will pursue in this 68 paper, specifically if psychology at that time is a stranger, which more or less invades philosophy,
69
and then changes many of the philosophical premises in the posterity. This will be done by pursuing 70 the aspect of subjectivity as one of the core characteristics of psychology, which it for sure was on a (Copleston 1963, p. 293) . His emphasis on subjectivity was a consequence 76 of Hegel's philosophy, which must be regarded as a continuation of Kant's critical philosophy. The 77 twelve innate categories Kant came up with to define and form the premises for our scientific 78 understanding of the outer world implied also that an investigation of the outer world, almost by 79 necessity, turns out to be an investigation of the investigator even as much as the world itself. The 80 investigator is a thinking being, and consequently there is a kind of differentiated identity between 81 reason, or the spirit, and the real. They are united in a sense, but they are at the same time 82 discernable. Rosenkranz brings this Hegelian point a step further by focusing on the sensory 83 (Empfindungen) aspects that form the connection between the outer and the inner world. And this 84 leads to psychology as "the science of the subjective spirit", which is the subtitle of his publication 85 on psychology (Rosenkranz 1863) . Thus a sensory experience cannot be isolated from the 86 experiencer, and this makes that the experience represents a totality, in which the spirit is highly 87 involved. This makes that the experiences of the particular, which characterizes a sensory 88 experience, is immediately dissolved and replaced by a general understanding, which is the 89 contribution of the spirit. On this basis Rosenkranz states that the spirit fulfils a world that basically 90 appears in its particularities ("Der Geist hat daher an seinen Empfindungen die Erfüllung seiner 91 particularren Welt. " Rosenkranz 1863, p. 162) .
92
This understanding of psychology formed the background for Søren Kierkegaard's philosophy.
3 of 11 both drew the same conclusion about the role of subjectivity as an unalterable factor in human 97 understanding and reasoning. Yet there is one important difference between the two. Hegel lets 98 objectivity and subjectivity be united in the spirit. This is also the perspective Rosenkranz promotes 99 in his thesis. Kierkegaard, on the other hand, does not accept any unification or mediation between 100 subjectivity and objectivity. This is the point he highlights when he criticizes Hegel's logic.
101
According to Kierkegaard, logic must be regarded as a static and objective science: "In logic, no 102 movement must come about, for logic is, and whatever is logical only is" (Kierkegaard 1980, p 
113
feet to move on, without anyone's being able to observe them. (Kierkegaard 1980, p. 12.) 
114
It may sound as a paradox that Kierkegaard, who founded existentialism and launched the 115 slogan "truth is subjectivity" (Kierkegaard 2009 ), at the same time highlights an insurmountable 116 distinction between objectivity and subjectivity. Yet this is pointing at the core of Kierkegaard's 117 existentialism, specifically that a human's life is expelled in the middle of the tension between the 118 disparate and irreconcilable aspects of the ideal and the actual -the objective and the subjective. As 119 long as we are living human beings, we are embedded in the subjective experiences of the actual,
120
and this makes that truth has to be subjectivity.
121
Thus Kierkegaard needed to find a science that actually brings in subjectivity, and he found 122 psychology, not least because of Rosenkranz' book, which explicitly defines psychology as the 123 science of subjectivity. This was, however, not the only source at hand for understanding 124 psychology. The background for his religious and philosophical ponderings, he says, was his father.
125
He writes about his father as one who never treated him as a child when he was a child. He rather 126 used him as a sparring partner for his religious ponderings, and his father's favourite reading was 127 Christian Wolff's "Reflections on God, the World, the Soul of Man, and Things in general" (Hannay 128 2001, p. 36 ). Yet this book was not just a speculative book about everything and nothing; it was one 
141
Thus this systematization had a prehistory that might be more or less narrowed down to the 16 th and 142 17 th centuries, in which the aspects of subjectivity and its relationship to psychology also seem to 143 have been shaped.
144
Subjectivity was not supposed to be a part of metaphysics. It was rather the opposite; 145 subjectivity contradicted metaphysics. Hence subjectivity was not even supposed to be a part of 146 psychology when Wolff included it in metaphysics. If we want to trace from where subjectivity in 147 philosophy actually did come, several sources have to be considered and taken into account. Here, I
Germany, the increasing interest in doing empirical research among scholars, and finally, the 150 dissemination of folk culture among academics and the aristocracy by means of the art of printing.
151
Additionally, the political turmoil in especially Germany at that time is of course also an important 
Psychology and the Lutheran Reformation in Germany
178
The question, however, is not to find the original content of psychology, but rather to detect the 179 tendencies the appearance of the term actually was a part of. Another movement psychology in fact 180 was a part of, was the German Reformation (Vidal 2011 
215
The need for a deeper understanding of the human nature among Protestants was intimately 
245
The scholastic understanding of metaphysics, therefore, changed radically in German 
Psychologia empirica and the increased interest in empirical research
269
To define natural theology as a delineated and independent subject reflects some aspects of the 
277
Wolff emphasizes also that the cosmology is closely related to natural theology, but the focus is 
292
Empirical psychology was one of these meta-scientific fields, but it cannot be regarded as a
293
natural part of metaphysics as it focused on sensation, which is about the particular. There are at 294 least two reasons for why psychology on a certain historical point ended up as a part of metaphysics.
295
One is the fact that observation had already been applied as a part of scientific discoveries. Both Plato, specifically that the universe is governed by a certain order, is retained by both Galilei and 
322
There is no doubt that Wolff's psychology aimed to form a basis for scientific activities.
323
Even Psychologia rationalis contributed to this by formulating the rational capacities of the soul and 
338
Thus, the reciprocity between observations and theory appears as a more or less necessary 339 condition to achieve new knowledge, and this requires both the empirical and the rational 340 psychology to attain a fully understanding of the nature of the senses and the mind.
341
These perspectives on the process of acquiring scientific knowledge were strange, new, and not 342 exactly fully accepted. In the New Essays on Human Understanding, Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz 343 refers, through the voice of Philaletes, to the common understanding that "la Philosophie
344
experimentale" is not able to generate "connoissance scientifique" -scientific knowledge (Leibniz 1985 
352
of them are to be trusted straightaway. (Frankelius 2007, p. 107, translated by this author) 353
Linné, therefore, applied observations, but they did not work as a warranty for true knowledge.
354
Instead he sketches a type of method that must be described as deductive and axiomatic. He follows
355
three fundamental principles that form the premises for this method: (1) No new species will be 356 created, (2) the offspring is always a replica of the parents, and (3) similarities define the specie. A
357
fourth premise is that Linné envisages the whole nature is being governed by a purpose given by the
358
Creator. Thus natural theology forms an important condition for Linné's research and the method he
359
is applying. The expediency or purpose is detected by classification and naming of the exemplar.
360
The method therefore starts with a general understanding given by paramount labels, and the 
366
In all those three areas that apparently include features of subjectivity, they also seem to 367 overrule subjectivity with an ultimate ideal of objectivity. This is also true when it comes to priori knowledge" (Kant 2010, p. 13-14) . 
380
Kant's critical philosophy must in many ways be regarded as a counter-attack to the fact that 381 psychology had already invaded metaphysics and introduced the aspect of subjectivity to 382 philosophy. This is certainly true for the first critique. Yet the strategy is predominantly to be friend 383 with the most essential part of the enemy, which is the aspect of subjectivity. Consequently,
384
transforming subjectivity up to a transcendental level where the a priori aspects are highlighted can 385 provide this. According to Kant, no empirical sciences can be brought up to that level, and they will 386 by necessity contradict with the very idea of achieving a pure science. This is why he also concludes:
387
"Empirical psychology must therefore be banished from the sphere of metaphysics, and is indeed 388 excluded by the very idea of that science" (Kant 2010, p. 472) . However, Kant cannot place it 389 completely aside as it has been a part of metaphysics for such a long time, and "we must permit it to 390 occupy a place in metaphysics -but only as an appendix to it" (loc. cit.), and he continues: "It is a 391 stranger who has been long a guest; and we can make it welcome to stay, until it can take up a more 392 suitable abode in a complete system of anthropology -the pendant to empirical physics (loc.cit.).
393
Immanuel Kant followed up this, first of in the last thesis he completed, the Anthropology from a understanding Rabelais' novels is revealed through the history of the laughter.
428
In Bakhtin's thesis on Rabelais, he starts with pursuing the history of the laughter. One of the 429 main findings in this examination is:
430
Laughter is not a universal, philosophical form. It can refer only to individual and 431 individually typical phenomena of social life. (Bakhtin 1984, p. 67.) 432
By this statement he says that the laughter is predominantly a subjective experience; or, even 433 more correctly: The laughter highlights the experience of oneself as a subject. This type of experience 434 of oneself as a subject is provided by several factors. One is that the laughter itself promotes the 435 individual's participation in the humorous situation. Another is that this participation is related to a 436 very peculiar situation. A third aspect is that both the participation and the laughter itself are given 437 by and through the body. On this background the laughter is primarily a sensorial experience that is 438 located to and depending on a certain place and time. Consequently, it appears in certain events, 
442
and this is the background for Rabelais' novels.
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